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1

INTRODUCTION
Early morning on July 22, 2019, a civilian market in Idlib Syria was hit by an airstrike.
Videos taken by residents shows community members and first responders scurrying through the
rubble to aid and rescue anyone they can find.1 A video taken thirty minutes after the strike shows
a group of first responders carrying the lifeless body of a child, and then attempting to run for
cover as they notice an aircraft returning above.2 That aircraft sent a second airstrike to hit the
civilian market again, adding to a cumulative death total of 39 civilians and first responders. 3 This
second airstrike is purposely conducted as part of a drone strike scheme known as the “doubletap”. The double-tap method involves striking an initial target, then subsequently striking the same
area after first responders and rescuers arrive at the scene.4 Not only does this method of attack
significantly increase death totals among innocent civilians worldwide, but it also deters first
responders to assist drone strike victims due to fear of a second strike.5 Although the attack on
Idlib was eventually traced to the Russian military, the United States has been using “double taps”
as part of its drone strike program to target violent terrorist groups in the Middle East since at least
2012.6 The tactic has been called “unquestionably a war crime” by United Kingdom’s then foreign
secretary in 2016 and now Prime Minister, Boris Johnson.7 That general statement made by Boris
Johnson is supported by the international law community as a whole, as well as customary

Idlib ‘double tap’ air strike Russia says never was, BBC (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/worldmiddle-east-49528495.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Kristina Benson, "Kill "Em and Sort It Out Later:" Signature Drone Strikes and International Humanitarian Law,
27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 17, 48 (2014).
5
See Id. at 49.
6
Jerome Taylor, Outrage at CIA’s deadly ‘double tap’ drone attacks, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 26, 2012),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/outrage-cia-s-deadly-double-tap-drone-attacks8174771.html.
7
Idlib ‘double tap’ air strike Russia says never was, supra note 1.
1
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International Humanitarian Law (“IHL’).

8

Hence, the United States’ use of double-tap drone

strikes violates IHL.
I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

IHL regulates the conduct of war, including targeted killings generally and “double tap”
airstrikes specifically.9 IHL is legitimized and binding via acknowledgment through several
codifications. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Geneva Protocol II of 1977 apply
to all parties in armed conflicts.10 Additionally, Article 52, section 1 and section 2 of Protocol I of
1977

provides

general

protection

to

civilian

and

civilian

objects

of

armed

attacks.11 IHL establishes basic principles that have become customary international law, including
the principles of distinction and proportionality.12 Although some nations, including the United
States, are not party to the Additional Protocol, a nation does not have to sign the treaty to be
bound by the recognized customary international law of IHL.13 Intuitively, the United States and
its use of double-tap airstrikes can be scrutinized under the principles of distinction and
proportionality because those principles are considered customary international law.
Although the United States has never been punished for committing war crimes due to its
drone strike program and use of double-tap drone strikes specifically, there was once a hope
amongst humanitarian groups for more accountability when President Obama signed Executive

8

See Michael Plachta, COUNCIL OF EUROPE ADOPTS RESOLUTION AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DRONES AND TARGETED KILLINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
31 NO. 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 136 (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) calls on
States to refrain from using procedures for targeting individuals based on mass surveillance techniques, including
“double-tap strikes.”).

9

See Benson, supra note 4, at 27.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See Id.
10
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Order 13732.

14

The Executive Order required more transparency about the United States drone

strike program by requiring annual reports on strikes, death totals of innocent civilians, and
thorough investigations of reports on civilian casualties.15 However, President Trump has
eradicated transparency by revoking the Executive Order.16 Although dimming the light on
accountability for the United States drone strike program, the United States has still accounted for
2,243 known drone strikes under the Trump administration; 365 more drone strikes conducted than
President Obama’s entire eight-year presidency. 17
Now with drastically less transparency, the United States seems more likely than ever to
get away with targeting innocent civilians as part of its drone strike program. Given the significant
uptick in the use of drone strikes by the United States’ Armed Forces, it is inferable that doubletap drone strikes also are continually being carried out, leading to more civilian casualties at the
hands of the United States than ever before.18 Ironically, even with less transparency it is more
apparent that the double-tap tactic has been molded into the status quo of the nation’s foreign
policy and has virtually normalized the tragedy of using air strike technology to purposely attack
innocent civilians.19 Despite the normalized use of double-tap drone strikes in United States’
foreign policy, the international law community has the capability to cease the use of double-tap
drone strikes in the United States’ drone strike program.
The argument will be exemplified through showing that double-tap drone strikes violate
two major principles of IHL. First, the use of double-tap drone strikes can be shown to violate the
14

Kelsey D. Atherton, Trump Inherited the Drone War but Ditched Accountability, FOREIGN POLICY (May 22,
2020), html. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/obama-drones-trump-killings-count/.
15
Id.
16
Trump revokes Obama rule on reporting drone strike deaths, BBC (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47480207.
17
Id.
18
See Steve Niva, Trump’s Drone Surge, MERIP (Summer 2017), https://merip.org/2018/02/trumps-drone-surge/.
19
See Atherton, supra note 14.
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IHL principle of distinction because the tactic of double-tapping intentionally targets
non-combatants. Next, the use of double-tap drone strikes violates the IHL principle of
proportionality. This will be shown by first analyzing the United States’ claims of military
necessity for conducting drone strikes generally, and if double-tap drone strikes can ever truly be
justified as a military necessity. After establishing potential claims for a United States’ military
necessity for conducting double-tap drone strikes, the argument that such claims of military
necessity do not outweigh the severe risks brought upon civilians will be presented. Consequently,
the use of double-tap drone strikes can also be shown to violate the IHL principle of
proportionality. Finally, the note will show that the international law community has recently taken
stricter stances on targeted killings that put innocent lives in grave risk. This trend in international
law focusing on preventing attacks on innocent civilians should also focus on the United States
use of double-tap drone strikes, but President Trump pulling Executive Order 13732 has made it
too difficult to truly scrutinize the United States drone strike program. If national attention on the
issue of transparency could pressure the next President of the United States to reinstall
transparency, then the United States use of double-tap drone strikes could potentially be
terminated.
II.

PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION

Common Article 3 provides a rudimentary framework for the minimum standards of the
principle of distinction, while Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II supplement much
of the detail. 20 The text of Common Article 3 does not explicitly state that violations incur criminal
liability, but the United Nations has stated that those nations that conduct or authorize a targeted

20

1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
XXXV (4th prtg. 2009).

5

killing in violation of IHL can be prosecuted for war crimes. 21 The United States itself has codified
a version of the principle of distinction in the War Crimes Act of 1996, stating any conduct
constituting a grave breach of Common Article 3 is a war crime.

22

The applicability of the War

Crimes Act of 1996 to the United States use of double-tap drone strikes is beyond the argument
made in this note. Nevertheless, the War Crimes Act shows that the United States – at least
facially – formally recognizes the importance of following the principle of distinction.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 states that in a non-international armed
conflict, violence is prohibited against “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause.”23 Essentially, case law interpreting Common
Article 3 has established four elements for finding a violation of the principle of distinction: (1) an
armed conflict; (2) a nexus between the conflict and alleged violation; (3) targeting of
noncombatants; and (4) appropriate mens rea for the war crime.24
The armed conflict requirement is assumed to be met because the United States government
generally has characterized its military presence in middle eastern countries to combat terrorist
groups as armed conflicts.25 Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
Common Article 3 applied to the Afghan conflict with Al-Qaeda and similar terrorist
organizations. 26 The nexus element requires that an alleged violation be “closely related” to the

21

Samuel Alexander, Double-Tap Warfare: Should President Obama Be Investigated for War Crimes?, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 261, 293 (2017).
22
War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012).
23
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, note 6.
24
Alexander, supra note 21, at 282.
25
Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 107-08 (2010).
26
See Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794-99 (2006).
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hostilities.27 The nexus element can also be assumed satisfied because the allegation of United
States’ double-taps violating IHL is triggered by their use in relation to combating terrorist groups.
Hence, the main areas of dispute as to whether the United States’ use of double-tap airstrikes
violates the principle of distinction are if the United States is targeting combatants or noncombatants, and if the appropriate mens rea is satisfied to constitute a violation under IHL. This
section first explores how combatants and non-combatants are defined in IHL, and how medical
personnel and innocent civilians targeted by double-tap drone strikes are considered noncombatants that are supposed to be protected under the principle of distinction. Next, the section
will analyze how the United States’ Armed Forces has the requisite mens rea needed to find a
violation of the principle of distinction. This analysis together establishes that double-tap drone
strikes violate the principle of distinction set forth in Common Article 3 because they fail to
distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and can only be conducted in a manner that
necessarily establishes the mens rea requirement to constitute a breach of Common Article 3. 28
A. Distinguishing Combatants and Non-combatants
To determine if non-combatants are the target of United States’ double-tap drone strikes,
what constitutes a non-combatant, or a combatant must be established. Rule 3 of Customary IHL
states that all members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are combatants, except medical
and religious personnel. 29 Additionally, civilians are also not considered persons of an armed force
granted they are not joining in the hostilities. 30 Therefore, medical assistants and innocent civilians
effected by double-tap drone strikes cannot be considered combatants under the IHL principle of

27

Alexander, supra note 21, at 282.
Id. at 264.
29
1 Henckaerts, supra note 20, at 18.
30
See Id. at 17.
28
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distinction because they are not taking part in the hostilities between the United States Armed
Forces and the terrorist groups claimed to be targeted. 31
The United States has recognized this combatant and non-combatant distinguishment of
medical personnel and civilians, by explicitly adopting the principle in its own U.S. Naval
Handbook.

32

IHL principle of distinction and the United States recognizes that for the United

States to carry out a proper drone strike, it must target members of the armed forces and not
medical personnel or civilians.33 Despite an official recognition, the United States’ use of
double-tap drone strikes fails to distinguish the terrorist groups desired to be attack and medical
personnel or civilians in the targeted area.
i.

Medical Personnel

Both permanent medical personnel of armed forces and temporary medical personnel
assisting an armed force are considered non-combatants for as long their medical assignment
lasts.

34

Medical personnel are provided even greater protection than the ordinary civilian class

because even medical personnel working permanently to assist an armed force are not considered
combatants. 35 Therefore, permanent medical personnel to an armed force, or temporary medical
personnel are not considered combatants because they are not actually taking a part of the
hostilities. 36

31

Id. at 13.
The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Dep’t of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations & Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Department of Transp., and U.S. Coast Guard § 605 (1995).
33
Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Reaffirming the Distinction Between Combatants and Civilians: The Cases of the
Israeli Army's "Hannibal Directive" and the United States' Drone Airstrikes Against Isis, 33 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 765, 767 (2016).
34
1 Henckaerts, supra note 20, at 13.
35
See Id.
36
See Id.
32

8

By nature of the double-tap tactic, the subsequent drone strike of a double-tap is launched
when strike rescuers and medical personnel arrive at the scene to provide aid.

37

It is difficult, if

not impossible, to claim that the United States is able to distinguish between the protected class of
medical personnel and combatants where the timing of the subsequent strike is purposely carried
out when the medical personnel arrive to help the injured. Moreover, it is equally difficult for the
United States to claim that the medical personnel are assisting the targeted terrorist groups in a
way that eradicates their protection as non-combatants because they would be provided protection
under IHL even if the medical personnel worked permanently for the terrorist groups targeted. The
goal of the United States’ drone strikes against terrorist groups may be to deter terroristic activity,
but the double-tap deters first responders from assisting victims. 38 Consequently, double-tap drone
strikes cause reluctance in emergency services and assistance not just for legitimate targets of the
strike, but for the protect class of civilians that are necessarily impacted by the drone strike. This
horrific consequence stems from the United States failure to distinguish the targeted terrorist
groups in a double-tap drone strike from the medical personnel there to assist the injured that stems
from the nature of the attack itself. Thus, the United States’ use of double-tap drone strike does
not properly distinguish between combatants and medical personnel because double-tap drone
strikes naturally do not distinguish between the targeted terrorist group and the protected medical
personnel that subsequently arrive on scene to provide aid.

37
38

Benson, supra note 4, at 48.
Id.

9

ii.

Protecting Civilians

Generally, Recommendations I and II define civilians under IHL as all persons who are not
members of the armed forces and/or do not take direct part in the hostilities.

39

Civilian villages

are also provided protection from attack, as established in the Fourth Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Annexed Regulations (1907).40 The
importance of protecting civilians from attack and ensuring they are not targeted is the main goal
of the principle of distinction in the first place. 41 IHL requires that the United States in conducting
its drone strike program, including double taps, attempts to distinguish between legitimate targets
and civilians. 42
Given the amount of available data available as to the United States’ drone strike program,
it can hardly be argued that civilians are not necessarily harmed by drone strikes. 43 Whether the
ability to distinguish between legitimate military targets and civilians in double-tap drone strikes
is ever possible is a point of contention. Issues arise for the United States to distinguish legitimate
military targets and civilians where members of terrorist groups such as the Taliban are regularly
integrated with civilian populations.

44

The ability to distinguish can be even more difficult where

it is hard to decipher normal civilian behaviors and suspicious behaviors. 45

39

1 Henckaerts, supra note 20, at 17; See also J. Jeremy Marsh & Scott L. Glabe, Time for the United States to
Directly Participate, 1 VA. J. INT'L L. 13, 16–17 (2011).
40
Moodrick-Even Khen, supra note 33, at 767.
41
Alexander, supra note 21, at 264.
42
Benson, supra note 4, at 35.
43
E.g., Chris Woods & Christina Lamb, CIA Tactics in Pakistan Include Targeting Rescuers and Funerals, THE
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, (Feb. 4, 2012), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-0204/cia-tactics-in-pakistan-include-targeting-rescuers-and-funerals.
44
Benson, supra note 4, at 35.
45
See Id. at 34 (“Individuals have also been targeted for driving a suspicious vehicle, spending time in or around
certain facilities, or operating certain types of communications equipment.”).
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The United States’ ability to show they are at the least attempting to distinguish terrorist
group members and civilians is weakened pertaining to the use of double-tap drone strikes. This
burden is in distant reach for justifying the use of a double-tap drone strike because the double-tap
tactic is necessarily carried out in a way which civilians are in great danger of being harmed.
Although the first strike could adequately distinguish the target and civilians, the second drone
strike can hardly ever. If the first drone strike in a double tap was successfully, then there would
be no need for the second drone strike because the target would be compromised and the goal of
the airstrike would be met. For the second drone strike to be able to distinguish between civilians
and targeted terrorist groups, the operator would have to determine that the target was not hit in
the first one, and that a second-strike minutes later would not only likely hit the target, but also
again distinguish the target from the civilians already compromised by the aftermath of the drone
strike.
Since double taps are executed in such a methodical way, where the second drone strike
hits twenty-five to thirty minutes after the first, and when first responders and civilians are there
to help the injured, it is irrational for the United States to justify that their operators are
distinguishing the targeted terrorist group members and civilians both before the initial strike and
before the subsequent strike. This argument counteracts the objective of the double-tap drone strike
anyways because the double-tap is purposely conducted to methodically launch a subsequent strike
at the same target, a few minutes later, no matter the specific circumstance. Therefore, there is
little to no room for distinguishing targeted terrorist groups and innocent civilians by the very
nature of a double-tap drone strike. Thus, it is almost impossible for the United States to justify its
use of double tap airstrikes in its drone strike program to target terrorist groups because it cannot
be said the subsequent drone strike adequately distinguishes between the target combatants and

11

military personnel arriving on scene to help the injured, or the civilians necessarily impacted in
the drone strikes.
B. Overcoming the Mens Rea Requirement
Even if found that the United States’ double tap drone strikes fails to distinguish
combatants and non-combatants (civilians and medical personnel), there would not be a violation
of the principle of distinction set forth in Common Article 3 if the death, damage, or injury was
merely incidental to an otherwise lawful attack.

46

To find a Common Article 3 violation of an

unlawful attack on civilians and civilian objects, it must be established that civilians were
intentionally targeted, or it was impossible not to know civilians were being targeted. 47 Therefore,
the necessary mens rea requirement to establish the United States’ double tap drone strikes violate
the principle of distinction is an intentional targeting of civilians.48
The United States has a legitimate argument that it lacks intent to target civilians in carrying
out its drone strike program and thus does not generally violate the principle of distinction because
the United States has recently taken steps to reduce the likelihood that its support of other countries
would be used to intentionally kill noncombatants. 49 As to the conflict in Yemen, the United States
has required that Saudi Arabia takes better precautionary steps to ensure they are avoiding hitting
civilian targets and causing disproportionate harm to civilians. 50 Additionally, Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo in 2018 ensured that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were in fact taking
greater care to avoid disproportionate harm. However, given the complete lack of transparency

46

Oona A. Hathaway, Aaron Haviland, Srinath Reddy Kethireddy, Alyssa T. Yamamoto, Yemen: Is the U.S.
Breaking the Law?, 10 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 1, 41 (2019).
47
1 Henckaerts, supra note 20, at 25; See also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, 512
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
48
Hathaway, supra note 46, at 41.
49
See Id. at 49-50.
50
Id.
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about the United States’ drone strike program, it is challenging to fact check Pompeo’s claims. 51
The United States’ official stance would support its argument that the United States Armed Forces
does not possess the requisite mens rea under the principle of distinction.

52

Regardless of the

United States defense as to the mens rea element of its general drone strike program, it is difficult
for it to use the same defense for double-tap drone strikes.
It is difficult for the United States to claim its Armed Forces lack the requisite intent to
target civilians by using double-tap drone strike because the subsequent airstrike is meant to be
carried out when more civilians and medical personnel are there to assist.53 Additionally, when
combating terrorist groups, it is more likely that civilian property and objects are purposely
attacked because terrorist groups often integrate with the civilian population they reside within. 54
At the very least, it is hard for the United States to show that it was impossible for it to know that
civilians were targeted in the subsequent attack of double-tap drone strikes because targeting the
same effected area where civilians necessarily are is part of the method of carrying out a successful
double-tap. The United States would have a difficult time showing double-tap drone strikes are
not executed intentionally to either hit the civilians around or in the civilian property, or during
the subsequent strike where more non-combatants arrive on scene to assist the injured because the
design of the double-tap is meant to attack during those situations. Therefore, double-tap drone
strikes are carried out in a way that satisfies the mens rea requirement to show a violation of the
IHL principle of distinction because the subsequent strike is intentionally carried out when it is
more likely for non-combatants to be in the targeted area, assisting the injured.

Id. at 41 (“At present, there have been no public reports of such intentional or knowingly disproportionate strikes
on civilians or civilian targets by U.S. forces during their operation against AQAP and ISIS.”).
52
Id. at 49-50.
53
See Benson, supra note 4, at 48.
54
See Id. at 35.
51

13

If there were enough transparency about the United States’ using double-taps, it would not
be difficult to show the United States Armed Forces is violating because double-taps innately ado
not satisfactorily distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Without transparency, the
only evidence of how the tactic is carried out by United States Armed Forces is through
independent journalist investigations, inferences from other countries use of double-tap an, d
testimonials from civilians impacted by double-taps. Therefore, more transparency would allow
investigations to go further into the specific details and orders carried out by the United States
Armed Forces to see if civilians in the targeted area are considered upon decisions to order a second
strike. Thus, the United States’ double-tap drone strike by their very nature violate the IHL
principle of distinction because they are carried out in furtherance of an armed conflict against
terrorist groups, a nexus between the conflict and the use of double taps is shown, it targets noncombatant civilians and medical personnel, and targets such non-combatants and/or their property
intentionally.
III.

MILITARY NECESSITY AND THE IHL

The IHL principle of proportionality is only satisfied if a claimed military necessity for an act
can be justified despite the humanitarian risks that arise from carrying out that act in an armed
conflict. 55 Generally, the greater significant and importance of the military necessity claimed, the
more risk is permitted to be legitimately imposed on innocent civilians.

56

Before balancing the

claimed military necessity of a double-tap drone strike and the humanitarian consequences, it is
first required to determine what the United States may claim as a justifying military necessity for
double-taps in the first place. This can be done by first determining what can generally justify any

55

Michael A. Conforti, Unharmonious Coexistence: How America's Military Obsession Has Demonstrated the
Incompatibility of Weaponized Drones and Sovereignty, 43 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 246, 265 (2017).
56
Moodrick-Even Khen, supra note 33 at 781.
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military necessity under Article 52 of Protocol I of 1977, and how the United States can use
potential justifications for double-tap drone strikes. Potential claims of the United States’ military
necessity for carrying out double-taps is difficult to definitively determine due to the secrecy of
the United States drone strike program. Nevertheless, inferences can be made from the fact drone
strikes are typically carried out in middle eastern countries against terrorist organizations. This
section explores if any potential claim of military necessity can ever justify carrying out a doubletap drone strike.
The United States only potential justification for disputing that its use of double-taps is not
unlawful is that the affected civilians are necessary collateral damage that is not excessive in light
of furthering its military objectives. 57 Under Article 52 of Protocol I of 1977, an armed attack is
only authorized if it is directed toward a military objective and grants general protections to civilian
objects. 58 Civilian objects are considered all objects that are not part of carrying out the military
objective. 59 An attacker may justify an armed attack by calculating the reasonable risk imposed
on civilians and find these risks do not outweigh of achievement of the justified military
objective.60 This calculation of furthering military objectives and reasonable risks is conducted so
that the IHL principle of proportionality is met.61
In the context of a double-tap drone strike, the killing must be militarily necessary, and the
use of force must be proportionate so that any military advantage is considered in light of expected
harm to civilians in the vicinity and must carried out in a way that prevents mistakes and minimizes

57

See 1 Henckaerts, supra note 20, at 29.
See Benson, supra note 4, at 28.
59
1 Henckaerts, supra note 20, at 33.
60
Moodrick-Even Khen, supra note 33, at 781.
61
Conforti, supra note 55, at 265.
58

15

harm to civilians.

62

The requirement of military necessity for a double-tap is difficult to meet,

particularly for the second strike, since the death or incapacitation of the initial target that could
justify a drone strike is likely to have occurred in the first strike. 63
A. U.S. “military necessity”
Under the Obama administration, the United States justified its use of drone strikes in middle
eastern counties by declaring it was in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated groups.64 John Brennan, a counter-terrorism adviser to the Obama administration,
justified the administrations use of drone strikes to carry out its goals of defeating these terrorist
groups by suggesting international law did not prohibit these tactics against these groups outside
active battlefields, particularly where countries involved either consent or do not act against these
terrorist groups themselves.

65

Despite these general justifications for drone strikes, the Obama

administration never set forth a distinction between lawful and unlawful drone strikes, particularly
where civilians were subject to harm. 66
The United State courts have not helped guide our foreign policy in drawing that line either.
In the Al-Aulaqi case, the D.C district court was presented with the issue of whether federal
officials can be held personally liable for their roles in drone strikes that target and kill United
States citizens.

67

However, the court punted on the issue, stating the government had a broad

authority to determine its own military necessity because the political question doctrine barred
courts to make complex policy judgments best left to decision-making authority the political

62

See Plachta, supra note 8 (discussing targeted killings generally).
See Alexander, supra note 21, at 290.
64
See Benson, supra note 4, at 24.
65
Id.
66
See US: End CIA Drone Attacks, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 19, 2011),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/19/us-end-cia-drone-attacks#.
67
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 45 (D.D.C 2010).
63

16

branches dealing with military and foreign affairs.

68

Therefore, if the United States’ claimed

military necessity for double-taps is to be found as not meeting the standard required to meet the
principle of proportionality, it is up to the international law community to uphold the IHL
principles.
Whether or not the United States can adequately justify its “military necessity” for double-taps
is uncertain since the Obama administration was never clear about how the United States
distinguishes between lawful and unlawful drone strikes. 69 The Obama administration also made
it difficult by publicly denying civilian harm due to its drone strikes in the face of a plethora of
statistical data showing otherwise.70 Now President Trump has perhaps made it more challenging
to determine the military necessity justification for double-taps by eradicating reporting
requirements per Executive Order 13732.71 The only way to determine the military necessity of
the United States’ use of double-taps is to draw inferences from the fact they are used as part of a
full drone strike program that generally targets terrorist groups in the Middle East. 72
Perhaps an even more expansive rationale for the purpose of double-tap drone strikes can be
shown in the subjective intent of President Trump as to combating terrorist groups. In 2015, then
presidential candidate Trump stated that “the best way to combat terrorists is to take out their
families”.

73

From this statement, it could be inferred that the administration in carrying out its

goals of combating terrorism, seeks to expand deterrent impacts of drone-strikes by also targeting

68

Id. at 52.
See US: End CIA Drone Attacks, supra note 66.
70
Benson, supra note 4, at 33.
71
See Trump revokes Obama rule on reporting drone strike deaths, supra note 16.
72
Woods, supra note 43.
73
See Murtaza Hussain, Civilian Deaths in U.S. Wars Are Skyrocketing Under Trump. It May Not Be Impeachable,
but It’s a Crime., THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 2, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/10/02/trump-impeachment
-civilian-casualties-war//.
69

17

family members of those affiliated with terrorist groups.74 Whether or not this is the official United
States’ position as to its military necessity is unclear, and the United States may instead consider
the official justification under the broad umbrella of combating terrorism. Regardless, any
legitimate “military necessity” to combat terrorism in the eyes of IHL cannot rationalize targeting
a subjected area a second time within only a few minutes, particularly where civilians not
associated with such terrorist groups are such a significant of the attack.
Although the Trump administration has withdrawn the requirement of releasing data about
dead and injured civilians due to U.S drone strikes, investigative reporting has still given glimpses
into the tragic reality that such outcomes still considerably occur.75 In 2017, civilian casualties in
Iraq and Syria alone increased by more than 200 percent from 2016, with 6,000 dead civilians due
to airstrikes.76 Since there is little information about the incidents of drone strikes that occurred
other than through investigative reporting, there is also little information as to how many of these
civilian deaths were due to double-taps. However, it can logically be deduced that the United States
is still engaging in double-tap drone strikes because known drone strikes have significantly
increased under the Trump administrations, and civilian deaths have subsequently increased as
well, despite less transparency about their use from the United States government. 77
It would be unreasonable to believe that despite these increases in drone attacks in the face of
less transparency, the United States has suddenly pulled back the use of double-tap drone strikes
despite the lack of current pressure to do so. Additionally, the United States’ backed Saudi Arabian
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Forces have recently been severely scrutinized for several blatant uses of double-taps in Yemen.78
The question that must necessarily be raised next is, does the United States’ military necessity of
combating terrorist groups by targeting not only terrorist group members, but others implicated by
actual or geographical association as a form of deterrence against terrorist activity, ever justify
blatantly putting innocent civilians at a greater risk of harm during a subsequent airstrike? The
answer to this issue can only truly be answered by weighing the United States military necessity
for conducting double-tap drone strikes against the risk of harm under the principle of
proportionality.
IV.

IHL PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY

This section seeks to explore if the United States’ potential claims of military necessity for
conducting double-tap drone strikes can pass muster under the IHL principle of proportionality.
For a double-tap drone strike to be deemed proportional, it would have to be established that the
incidental loss of civilian life cause by a double-tap would be outweighed by the military necessity
of subsequent airstrikes after the first.79 This section explores both the United States interest in
combating terrorism, as well as the known data showing how frequent drone strikes are used by
the United States military and how often they are inaccurate in hitting legitimate targets, while
putting innocent civilians in significant risk of injury and deaths. Next, this section proves that a
double-tap cannot ever be consider proportional given the great risks on innocent civilians because
of the great inaccuracy of the United States drone strike program generally. The United States’
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interest in combating terrorism in the middle east cannot be considered proportional to the grave
risk double-tap drone strikes put innocent civilian lives in.
The principle of proportionality is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, Article
57, Protocol II, and Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 80
The intended purpose of codifying the principle of proportionality is to preserve the value of
civilian lives.81 Through codification and state practice, proportionality has become a customary
rule of IHL that binds all states, including the United States.

82

Proportionality prohibits a state

attack that is expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury, or damage to civilians that is
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an attack.

83

Therefore, the United States would only be able to justify a legitimate risk of civilian life in
carrying out double-tap drone strikes if it can adequately justify its military necessity to combat
terrorism to be of greater importance than the incidental impact on innocent civilians.84
The United States’ ability to justify risking innocent civilian life so it could use double-tap
drone strikes also requires a determination of whether the first strike was successful as to meeting
the military necessity.

85

Requirements of proportionality weigh against a double-tap if the first

strike were successful in carrying out a military necessity because it would necessarily mean the
second and thirds strikes are less likely to be worth the risks to civilian life.
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Additionally, the

principle of proportionality also weighs against subsequent strikes where first responders and other
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civilians arrive after the first strike to help the injured. 87 Given the amount of known data about
collateral damage from drone strikes generally and double-taps specifically, the United States’ use
of double-tap drone strikes cannot be considered proportional to achieving its military necessity
of combating terrorism. 88
A. U.S Disproportionality
The United States’ military advantage argument on their side of the proportionality equation
as to its drone strike program is to manage risks engendered by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda
and ISIS.89 The United States’ own Naval Handbook acknowledges the principle of proportionality
and states that in considering the military advantage anticipated by its attacks, although incidental
injury and collateral damage may occur, it must not be excessive. 90 Although what is “excessive”
can be up for debate, what is known about the successes of the United States drone strike program
and the collateral damage produced raises serious concerns as to whether a double-tap drone strike
can ever be considered proportional.
When the Bureau of Investigate Journalism released its report on the United States drone strike
program under the Obama administration, it showed that around 98% of victims of drone strikes
are civilians, children, or “non-militants”. 91 Although the data now shows casualty rates are not
as high as initially reported, this may be due to both the lack of transparency that came from the
Obama administration about casualties prior to Executive Order 13732, and even less transparency
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about the drone strike program under the Trump administration.

92

Regardless of the reason for

casualty rates not being reported as high, United States drone strikes are still being carried out at
a rapid pace and with significant subsequent casualties. In Somalia in 2016 and 2017, the United
States was responsible for forty-nine drone strikes and 420 subsequent dead civilians.93 In 2018
alone, the United States carried out forty-five additional drone strikes in Somalia.
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In 2017 in

Yemen, the United States was responsible 127 air strikes, eighty-six more than the second most
airstrikes in one year in Yemen.
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Although only 136 were reported dead, the proportion of

airstrikes to civilian casualties of the 2017 Yemen airstrikes seem to be outliers. When looking at
data from other years and other countries, there is typically several more dead per each airstrike.96
The proportion anomaly can likely be explained by the now extreme lack of transparency in the
United States reporting.
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Furthering this logic, Afghanistan, where airstrikes from the United

States are found in the thousands, report almost no casualties whatsoever. 98 As the data shows that
generally the United States is ramping up its drone strike program under the Trump administration,
it can be logically inferred the United States is not pulling back on the use of double-taps, thus
furthering the danger civilians are already in from drone strikes generally. 99
Additionally, it is difficult to justify double taps as furthering the United States’ military
necessity given even less reporting to provide information about any success of drone strikes. One
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out of every four killed from a United States drone strike is labeled ‘other militant’, identified with
circumstantial evidence and no direct confirmation as to who the targets truly were.

100

Given

virtually no accurate data provided by the United States’ government about successes and failures
of the drone-strike program, it is even more difficult to determine if a subsequent airstrike directly
attacking area when first responders and civilians arrive to assist is successful in taking out the
initial target. Therefore, it is difficult for the United States to argue its military advantage is of
such great importance as to require the need for double-tap airstrikes where the advantage gained
by such conduct is not concrete and direct. The data provided by investigative reporting showing
the inaccuracy of drone strikes in general and the collateral damage that necessary follows does
not support the idea that the military advantage of combating terrorism is genuinely being met by
the United States drone strike program.
One could make the argument that if the first airstrike is inaccurate, then the second strike may
be necessary to ensure more likelihood of the target being hit. At that point of the argument is
where the principle of proportionality must take a stand and prevent such a tactic because the effect
of carrying out a questionable and inaccurate tactic to impede terrorist groups, effects innocent
civilians too greatly. The already quantified collateral damage despite the lack of full access to
information regarding effects of double tap airstrikes is already so great. Further, knowingly
striking when civilians arrive on the scene to assist the injured is implicitly acknowledging that
the collateral damage on civilian life will be directly impacted. A double-tap airstrike employed
by the United States knowing it necessarily results in serious collateral damage without genuine
confidence in successful results as to intended targets can hardly be considered proportional.

100
101

Moodrick-Even Khen, supra note 33, at 798-99.
Id.

101

23

Thus, such a use of double tap airstrikes employed by the United States would be prohibited by
Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, Article 57, Protocol II, Amended Protocol II to the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and therefore violate the IHL principle of
proportionality. 102
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not the United States drone strike program and double-tap drone strikes specifically
can be reeled in is questionable at best given the hiding of information surrounding the drone strike
program under the Trump administration. 103 Although inferences can be made about the current
use of double-tap airstrikes given the expanding drone strike program, little can be done in either
domestic law or international law if the executive branch refuses to bring back Executive Order
13732 to ensure more transparency. Public pressure on the Obama administration about
questionable drone strike tactics and deceitful statements made about drone strike use led President
Obama to issue Executive Order 13732 initially.

104

It is possible that if public pressure can be

exerted in the same on the next President of the United States, Executive Order 13732 can
potentially be re-instilled so that more information about the United States drone-strike program
can be known to the public. If the United States reverted to following the transparency set forth
Executive Order 13732, the international law community would now be more prepared to hold the
United States’ accountable for violating IHL principles by using double-tap drone strikes.
Currently, the international community has taken a stricter stance against both targeted killings
and drone strikes specifically. The Israeli Supreme Court was the first court to rule on the use of
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targeted killings by its military force in response to the leaks regarding its targeted killing
program.105 The Israeli Court held in addition to satisfying the principles of distinction and
proportionality, the Israeli government is required to show it met strict conditions to verify the
target, perform a post-killing independent investigation, and demonstrate the killing was carried
out to prevent civilian harm. 106 More transparency as to the United States’ drone strike program
could lead to a similar result of the United States government being required to conduct similar
thorough investigations and conduct targeted killings under the strictest of conditions only. If these
conditions were forced upon the United States, it is unlikely double-tap drone strikes could ever
be conducted because of their naturally inability to overcome the IHL principles of distinction and
proportionality.
In response to the Russian forces executing a double-tap drone strike on Idlib, the United
Nations Commission recommended that Russian forces cease its attack on civilians and civilian
objects in accordance with their obligations under IHL, especially against medical facilities and
personnel. 107 It also required compliance with the IHL obligation to minimize harm to the civilian
population, and further cease using weapons wide wide-area effects, including those used typically
in Russia’s double-tap drone strikes. 108 Therefore, if the United States had more transparency and
more information available about its own uses of double-tap drone strikes, it is likely the United
Nations Commission would similarly recommend the United States forces to comply with IHL
principles. Now that the international law has taken further steps to deter the use of double-tap
drone strikes since they violate several of the IHL principles by their very nature, the need for the
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United States to be more transparent about its drone strike program is more necessary than ever to
ensure the United States adheres to IHL principles. Executive Order 13732 was originally enacted
due to public pressure when investigations and data showed the atrocious aftermath of drone
strikes carried out by the United States.109 Now that the United States’ drone strike program is
accomplished with even less transparency and at a more aggressive rate, it has become more
embedded in the United States foreign affairs. The most efficient way to begin reeling in the United
States’ drone strike program, is to first shut down the use of the double-tap drone strike because it
is the most difficult form of targeting killing to justify since it innately violates the IHL principles
of distinction and proportionality.

109

See Atherton, supra, note 14.

